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on the formal requisites for negotiability 0 and the rights of a
holder in due course." The present series of comments12 discuss
other sections of articles 3 and 4. The subjects which are con-
sidered are transfer and negotiation,'$ material alterations, 1 4
the "impostor rule,""' the doctrine of Price v. Neal,16 the doc-
trine of Young v. Grote,'7 certification, 8 and deferred posting.1 9
It is hoped these papers may be of some assistance to the legis-
lators and bar of Louisiana whenever the Uniform Commercial
Code is considered for adoption by this state.
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments Law
of Louisiana-Transfer and Negotiation
The Uniform Commercial Code, if adopted in Louisiana, will
effectuate many changes in the law as it exists under the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law.' A number of these proposed changes
occur in the field of transfer and negotiation and this Comment
is limited in scope to those matters. To facilitate the discussion,
each of the applicable Code2 provisions is set out,8 followed by
an analysis of its effect on the present law.4
10. Comment, The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana - Formal Requisites of
Negotiability, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 403 (1955).
11. Comment, The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana -Rights of a Holder, 15
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 419 (1955).
12. The comments in this symposium were originally prepared as research
papers in the course on Commercial and Investment Papers conducted by Dean
Paul M. Hebert in the Spring Semester, 1955. The papers have been extensively
revised, under Dean Hebert's supervision, for publication.
13. See page 91 infra.
14. See page 105 infra.
15. See page 115 infra.
16. See page 128 infra.
17. See page 134 infra.
18. See page 141 infra.
19. See page 164 infra.
1. La. Acts 1904, No. 64, p. 147; LA. R.S. 7:1-195 (1950).
2. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS
EDITION (1952). Amendments made through 1955 as reflected in SUPPLEMENT
NO. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF TIE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (1955) bearing on the subject matter of the Comment are set
out and discussed where applicable.
3. UCC 3-207, 3-208, dealing with rescission and reacquisition respectively,
will not be discussed in this Comment.
4. Unless otherwise noted, Louisiana courts are in accord with the majority
of other jurisdictions in its interpretations of the sections of the NIL herein dis-
cussed. Consequently, on many points no reference will be made to Louisiana
jurisprudence.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Transfer and the Right to Endorsement of Unendorsed
Instruments
UCC section 3:201 provides: "(1) Transfer of an in-
strument vests in the transferee such rights as the trans-
feror has therein, except that a transferee who has himself
been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or
claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from
a later holder in due course.
"(2) A transfer of a security interest in an instrument
vests the foregoing rights in the transferee to the extent of
the interest transferred.
"(3) Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of
an instrument not then payable to bearer gives the transferee
the specifically enforceable right to have the unqualified in-
dorsement of the transferor. Negotiation takes effect only
when the indorsement is made and until that time there is
no presumption that the transferee is the owner."
One of the features which distinguishes section 3-201 (1) of
the Code from NIL section 49 is that the provision of the Code
applies to any transfer, whether by transferors who are holders
or not, and whether the transfer is by negotiation or not.5 While
NIL section 490 refers only to non-endorsing holders, it is doubt-
ful that any change in the law will be effected by the broader
scope of section 3-201 (1) .7 However, such additional language
in the Code does constitute a desirable clarification.
In keeping with the broad provisions of the Code, section
3-201 (1) employs the term "rights" rather than the term "title"
which is used in NIL section 49.1 Thus, even if the transferor
5. UCC 3-201, comment 1.
6. LA. R.S. 7:49 (1950) : "Where the holder of an instrument payable to his
order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the trans-
feree such title as the transferer had therein, and the transferee acquires, in ad-
dition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferer. But for the purpose
of determining whether the transferee is a holder in due course, the negotiation
takes effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made."
7. For a comprehensive treatment by a leading authority of the scope of article
3 of the Code concerning problems involving transfers and negotiations, see Britton,
Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and Article 3
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEX. L. REv. 153, 154 (1953). For a dis-
cussion of the changes made in article 3 by the 1955 amendments, see Vergari,
Amending the Uniform Code- In re Articles 8, 4 and 5, 28 TEmPLE L.Q. 529, 535(1955).
8. LA. R.S. 7:49 (1950).
(Vol. XVI
COMMENTS
has no "title," the transferee would still acquire whatever rights
the transferor might have had.9 Another change which should
eliminate a conflict existing under the NIL'0 is the provision of
section 3-201 (1) which does not limit transfers to those for
value." Thus, since the word "value" is omitted, the Code can
be interpreted as approving transfers by gift.
Section 3-201 (1), in prohibiting a prior holder who has notice
of a defense from improving his position by taking from a later
holder in due course,12 expands the scope of NIL section 58,13
which prohibits a reacquiring holder who is a party to any fraud
or illegality affecting the instrument from becoming a holder in
due course. In addition, the Code enlarges upon the NIL pro-
vision by making the rule applicable to reacquiring transferees
and not just to reacquiring holders.
Section 3-201(2) broadens the scope of application of NIL
section 2714 so as to benefit transferees of security interests who
acquire an instrument from non-endorsing transferors, instead
of restricting such benefits to holders only.
Many courtsl 5 hold that, in the absence of a prior agreement
to the contrary, a transferee of an unendorsed instrument under
NIL section 49 is entitled to an unqualified endorsement. Section
3-201 (3) eliminates any doubt on the question by granting a
transferee for value the right to acquire the unqualified endorse-
ment of his transferor by an action for specific performance.""
At the same time, the section allows the parties to agree to a
qualified endorsement. It is important to note, however, that
under section 3-201 (3) the right to an unqualified endorsement
9. UCC 3-201, comment 1.
10. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 657-58 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948)
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 295 (1943).
11. UCC 3-201, comment 2.
12. This new provision of the Code adopts the rule of Dollarhide v. Hopkins,
72 Ill. App. 509 (1897), decided before the advent of the NIL, wherein the court
denied the ability of a party having knowledge of the maker's defenses to a promis-
sory note to purge the note of such defenses by assigning it to a third person and
then reacquiring the note.
13. L.& R.S. 7:58 (1950) : "But a holder who derives his title through a
holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument, has all the rights of such former holder in respect of all
parties prior to the latter."
14. LA. R.S. 7:27 (1950) : "Where the holder has a lien on the instrument,
arising either from contract or by implication of law, he is deemed a holder for
value to the extent of his lien."
15. Simpson v. First Nat. Bank, 94 Ore. 147, 185 Pac. 913 (1919). For a




is only applicable to transfers for value. Therefore, where the
transfer is by gift, the donee cannot demand his transferor's
unqualified endorsement. 17 The question of whether or not the
donee can demand a qualified endorsement is left unanswered by
the Code.
The Code makes no change in the rule of NIL section 49, which
provides that negotiation takes effect only upon actual endorse-
ment of the instrument. No retroactive effect is given to such
endorsement either under the Code or the NIL.
Section 3-201(3), by providing that there is no presumption
that the transferee of the instrument is the owner thereof until
endorsement is made, is in accord with the rule followed in
Louisiana and the majority of jurisdictions on the subject.'
Under the majority rule, NIL section 49 is interpreted to mean
that since a transferee of an unendorsed instrument is not a
holder, technically he does not have lawful possession and, there-
fore, must prove that he is the owner of the instrument.'9 Con-
sequently, since the Code follows this prevailing construction, it
is merely a restatement of the rule which exists under the NIL.
Transfers Which Are Negotiations
UCC section 3-202 provides: "(1) Negotiation is the
transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee
becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is
negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement; if
payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery.
"(2) An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of
the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly
affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.
16. UCC 3-201, comment 6.
17. Ibid.
18. In declaring that the presumption is that a note not endorsed is the prop-
erty of the payee, the court in Bertrand Feed Co. v. Dedebant, 9 Orl. App. 321,
322 (1912), held that "this presumption is not overcome by the mere fact of the
notes being in the physical possession of a third person; but it may be rebutted
by evidence showing that such third person is the true owner and bona fide holder
[sic] thereof." However, as applied to a transferee of unendorsed paper and ac-
cording to the definition of holder in NIL § 191, the court's use of the term
"holder" is legally inexact. NIL § 191 provides that holder "means the payee or
indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." See
Roberts v. Howard, 15 La. App. 279, 131 So. 496 (1930).
19. Capital Hill State Bank v. Rawlins Nat. Bank, 24 Wyo. 423, 160 Pac.
1171 (1916). See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW 650-53 (7th ed.,
Beutel, 1948) ; BRIToN, BILLs AND NoTms 289-91 (1943).
(Vol. XVI
COMMENTS
"(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation only
when it conveys the entire instrument or any unpaid residue.
If it purports to be of less it operates only as a partial assign-
ment.
"(4) Words of assignment, condition, waiver, guaranty,
limitation or disclaimer of liability and the like accompany-
ing an indorsement do not affect its character as an indorse-
ment."
In order to properly compare section 3-202 (1) with its coun-
terpart in the NIL, section 30,20 the differences between various
definitions in the Code and the NIL should be examined.
Under NIL section 19121 "holder" means "the payee or in-
dorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer
thereof," while under section 1-201 (20) of the Code "holder"
means "a person who is in possession of a document of title or
an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued, or in-
dorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." The most
obvious distinction between the two definitions is that the Code's
definition includes documents of title and investment securities
and the NIL does not. However, NIL section 191 has been in-
terpreted to include bonds, mortgages, chattel notes, and similar
securities.2 2 Although the language of the Code differs somewhat
from that of the NIL, the Code and the NIL contain the same
provision to the effect that payees and endorsees in possession
are holders.
Under the NIL, the only or last endorsement must be an en-
dorsement in blank to render an instrument which is payable to
order a bearer instrument.28 Section 1-201 (5) of the Code de-
fines "bearer" as "the person in possession of an instrument...
payable to bearer or indorsed in blank." There is no express
requirement that the last endorsement must be in blank to render
the instrument bearer paper. While the Code's definition would
probably be interpreted to require the last endorsement to be in
blank, it could also be interpreted to mean that the instrument
20. LA. R.S. 7:30 (1950): "An instrument is negotiated when it is trans-
ferred from one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee
the holder thereof. If payable to bearer It Is negotiated by delivery, if payable
to order it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery."
21. LA. R.S. 7:191 (1950).
22. Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 8, and the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEn. L. REV. 531, 535 (1951).
23. LA. R.S. 7:9(5) (1950).
19551
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
is bearer paper even if it contains a blank endorsement followed
by a special endorsement. 24 Section 3-204 (2) of the Code con-
fuses the situation further by providing that "an instrument
payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer
and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed."
(Emphasis added.) The result of the foregoing complications is
that the Code's definition of "bearer" lacks the clarity and cer-
tainty of its counterpart in the NIL. It is submitted that sections
1-201(5) and 3-204(2) of the proposed Code require revision
because of their inconsistency.
While the definitions of the term "negotiation" are similar
under the Code and the NIL,25 one major difference should be
noted. NIL section 30 reads: "[I] t [an instrument] is negotiated
by the indorsement of the holder" and thereby confines negotia-
tions to transfers by holders only. Thus, transfers from a maker
to a payee are not considered as a negotiation under the NIL.26
The Code contains no provision similar to that quoted from NIL
section 30. It must be assumed, therefore, that by such omission
it was probably intended that such transfers as that from maker
to payee should fall within the Code's definition of negotiation.
Section 3-202(1) provides that an instrument payable to
order is "negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorse-
ment." (Emphasis added.) Why the Code added the word
"necessary" is not clear. NIL section 30 does not contain such
a requirement. The comment on section 3-202 is silent as to what
significance, if any, should be attached to the word "necessary."
On the other hand, both the Code and the NIL provide that the
method of negotiation of bearer instruments is by delivery.
Section 3-202(2) is basically the same as the first sentence
of NIL section 31.27 The Code provision, however, is more pre-
cise; it states that "an indorsement must be written on the in-
strument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a
part thereof." The language is intended to codify interpreta-
tions of NIL section 31 to the effect that an endorsement pinned
24. Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law
and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEx. L. Rav. 153, 158 (1953).
25. LA. R.S. 7:30 (1950). For the text of this section, see note 20 8upra.
26. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 194 (1943).
27. LA. R.S. 7:31 (1950) : "The indorsement must be written on the instru-
ment itself or upon a paper attached thereto. The signature of the indorser, with-
out additional words, is a sufficient indorsement."
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or clipped to an instrument does not constitute a negotiation.2s
Furthermore, under the majority interpretation of NIL section
31, in order for an endorsement on a separate attached paper to
operate as a negotiation, the common law requirement that there
must be no room on the instrument for further endorsements29
must be satisfied. If the requirement is met, the endorsement
will then be valid on an attached "allonge," although there is
nothing in the express language of the NIL that supports such a
requisite. The Code offers no textual solution to the problem. It
is true that comment 3 for section 3-202 states that the endorse-
ment can be on an "allonge," but nothing is said about whether
or not the instrument itself must be filled up before an "allonge"
can be used. Chances are, however, the present majority rule
will continue to be followed.
There is no requirement in the Code concerning the location
of the endorsement on the instrument. Therefore, the Code
would not disturb the decision of the Louisiana court in White
System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall,80 which interpreted NIL
section 31 to permit an endorsement to be on the face of a note
just above the signatures of the makers.
Section 3-202 (3) retains the rule of NIL section 3231 which
provides that to be effective the endorsement must convey the
entire instrument or unpaid residue. Thus the Code is consistent
with the decision of the Louisiana court in Public Inv. Co. v.
Stafford,32 a case holding a note that was endorsed for the pro-
portion and to the extent of the percentage shown opposite the
endorsers' signatures to be negotiable. The court said such en-
dorsement satisfied the requirements of NIL section 32 because
the whole amount payable was transferred by the endorsements
and not just a part of that amount, and because such endorse-
ment merely limited the respective endorser's liability.
Section 3-202(3) clarifies a point on which NIL section 32
is silent by providing that if the endorsement purports to convey
28. UCC 3-202, comment 3; Clark v. Thompson, 194 Ala. 504, 69 So. 925
(1915). For a collection of additional cases, see BRIrTON, BILLS AND NOTES
225-26 (1943).
29. In the decision of Clark v. Thompson, 194 Ala. 504, 69 So. 925 (1915),
the court held that the use of the "allonge" cannot be approved where there is
sufficient room for the indorsement on the back of the instrument itself. For a
general discussion, see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 600-01 (7th ed.,
Beutel, 1948) ; BRiTToN, BILLS AND NOTES 225-26 (1943).
30. 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951).
31. LA. R.S. 7:32 (1950).
32. 195 So. 817 (La. App. 1940).
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less than the entire instrument, it shall constitute a partial as-
signment. NIL section 32 merely provides that such a transfer
is not a negotiation, but says nothing as to its effect.33
Section 3-202(4) is intended to reject decisions which have
prevented the addition of words of assignment3 4 and words of
guaranty35 from operating as an endorsement. These decisions
represent a minority view, for under NIL section 3830 the ma-
jority of courts have held that words of assignment are mere sur-
plusage and do not affect the negotiability of the instrument.37
And as to words of guaranty, the decision of a California court
in Adolph Ramish, Inc. v. Woodruff38 is representative of the
majority opinion on the subject. There the court held such words
to be words of enlargement, rather than limitation, which render
the transferor liable as a guarantor in addition to being liable
as an endorser. Therefore, an endorsement of a holder accom-
panied by words of guaranty, would constitute a negotiation.
Comment 3 of section 3-202 indicates that the Code follows the
majority in both the words of assignment and words of guar-
anty situations.
Although the Code's language is preferable, the use of the
terms "words of waiver" and "condition" merely codifies the re-
sult reached under NIL section 39 to the effect that the use of
such terms does not render the instrument non-negotiable.3 9 Sim-
ilarly, the use of the term "limitation or disclaimer of liability"
in the Code reaches the same result as NIL section 38.40
33. Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 Tax. L. REV. 153, 163-64
(1953).
34. UCC 3-202, comment 5. See, e.g., Gale v. Mayhew, 161 Mich. 96, 125
N.W. 781 (1910) ; Carius v. Ohio Contract Purchase Co., 30 Ohio App. 57, 164
N.E. 234 (1928).
35. UCC 3-202, comment 6. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Hill, 105 F.2d 325 (3d Cir.
1939) ; Zuehlke v. Engel, 299 Wis. 386, 282 N.W. 579 (1938).
36. LA. R.S. 7:38 (1950): "A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser
a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the
indorser's signature the words 'without recourse' or any words of similar import.
Such an indorsement does not impair the negotiable character of the instrument."
37. Jones County Trust & Savings Bank v. Kurt, 192 Iowa 965, 182 N.W. 409
(1921) ; Divelbiss v. Burns, 161 Miss. 724, 138 So. 346 (1931) ; Thorp v. Minde-
man, 123 Wis. 149, 101 N.W. 417 (1904) ; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW 624-25 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 232 (1943).
38. 28 P.2d 360, 91 A.L.R. 684 (Cal. 1934), subsequent opinion, 2 Cal.2d 190,
40 P.2d 509, 96 A.L.R. 1146 (1934) ; see Cady v. Bay City Land Co., 102 Ore. 5,
201 Pac. 179, 21 A.L.R. 1367 (1921).
39. LA. R.S. 7:39 (1950) ; Perry Nat. Bank v. Engnell, 198 Iowa 26, 199
N.W. 283 (1924) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Kenney, 98 Tex. 293, 83 S.W.
368 (1904) ; see BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 162-63 (1943).
40. Page v. Ford, 65 Ore. 450, 131 Pac. 1013 (1913) ; see BRANNAN, NEoo-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 626-27 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
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Endorsement Where the Instrument Is Payable to a Person
Under a Wrong or Misspelled Name
UCC section 3-203 provides: "Where an instrument is
made payable to a person under a misspelled name or one
other than his own he may indorse in that name or his own
or both; but signature in both names may be required by a
person paying or giving value for the instrument."
This section of the Code is similar to NIL section 43,41 but
contains two important additions. The Code allows an endorser
to endorse in his own true name alone, if desired. Also, to sup-
plement that addition, the Code provides that a person paying or
giving value for an instrument can require the holder to endorse
in both his true name and the one appearing on the instrument.
By requiring that the person who may require both signatures
must pay or give value, however, the Code denies to a person
acquiring an instrument by gift the right to require signatures
in both names.
Special Endorsements and Blank Endorsements
UCC section 3-204 provides: "(1) A special indorse-
ment specifies the person to whom or to whose order it makes
the instrument payable. Any instrument specially indorsed
becomes payable to the order of the special indorsee and may
be further negotiated only by his indorsement.
"(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular in-
dorsee, and may consist of a mere signature. An instru-
ment payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes payable
to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until spe-
cially indorsed or indorsed for collection (Section 3-206).
"(3) The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a
special indorsement by writing over the signature of the in-
dorser in blank any contract consistent with the character of
the indorsement." 42
Although NIL section 3443 and section 3-204(1) are worded
41. LA. R.S. 7:43 (1950) : "Where the name of a payee or indorsee is wrongly
designated or misspelled, he may indorse the instrument as therein described,
adding, if he think fit, his proper signature." For a general discussion, see
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 636-38 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
42. Subsection 3 of section 3-204 was added to the UCC by SUPPLEMENT No. 1
TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF TIE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE (1955).
43. LA. R.S. 7:34 (1950) : "A special indorsement specifies the person to
whom, or to whose order, the instrument is to be payable; and the indorsement
of such indorsee is necessary to the further negotiation of the instrument. An
indorsement in blank specifies no indorsee, and the instrument so indorsed is pay-
able to bearer, and may be negotiated by delivery."
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differently, their meaning is similar, except that the Code pro-
vides that "any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable
to the order of the indorsee and may be further negotiated only
by his indorsement." (Emphasis added.) Under NIL section
40,44 if an instrument on its face is payable to bearer, it may be
negotiated by delivery even though it is endorsed specially. 45 By
providing that any instrument which is specially endorsed may
be further negotiated only by endorsement, the Code reverses
the rule of NIL section 40 so that even paper payable to bearer
on its face can be negotiated when it has been specially en-
dorsed46 only by endorsement and not by mere delivery.
Under NIL sections 9 (5) and 34, if an instrument is payable
to order on its face, but has become payable to bearer by virtue
of a blank endorsement, the last endorsement is controlling.
Thus, if a blank endorsement is followed by a special endorse-
ment, the latter will control and negotiation can be effected only
by another endorsement. 47 There is no change here as this rule
is adopted by the last sentence of section 3-204 (2) of the Code.
NIL section 35,48 which allows a holder to "convert a blank
indorsement into a special indorsement by writing over the sig-
nature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent with the
character of the indorsement" was omitted from the 1952 draft
of the Code. The reason, as explained by the Code's draftsmen in
their comment is the misleading nature of NIL section 35 in that
that section led to attempts to alter materially the blank en-
dorser's contract by use of various terms, such as "payment
guaranteed. ' 49 This omission from the Code was criticized on
the ground that without something like the provision of NIL
section 35 if an instrument's last endorsement were in blank and
the instrument were stolen from the holder, a bona fide pur-
44. LA. R.S. 7:40 (1950) : "Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is in-
dorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery; but the
person indorsing specially is liable as indorser to only such holder as make the
title through his indorsement."
45. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 628-31 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948);
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 245 (1943).
46. UCC 3-204, comment 2.
47. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 248 (1943). For further discussion of the
subject, see Goble, Effect of a Special Endoreement on a Bearer Instrument, 5 ILL.
L.Q. 247 (1923).
48. LA. R.S. 7:35 (1950).
49. UCC 3-204, comment 1.
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chaser from the thief would get good title.50 The criticism ap-
parently was well taken, for the provision of NIL section 35 has
been reinstated as section 3-204(3) in the 1955 amendments to
the 1952 draft.
Under NIL section 34 an instrument which is endorsed in
blank may be negotiated by delivery. 51 Although this rule is re-
tained in the Code, it is made clearer by the provision that an
instrument endorsed in blank may be negotiated by delivery
alone.
Section 3-204 (2), by providing that an endorsement in blank
may consist of a mere signature, raises the problem of what
words may be added to the signature without damaging the ef-
fectiveness of the blank endorsement. NIL section 31, by provid-
ing that "the signature of the indorser, without additional
words, is a sufficient indorsement," is less ambiguous than its
counterpart in the Code.
Conditional Endorsements and Endorsements Prohibiting
Transfer
UCC section 3-205 provides: "Neither a conditional in-
dorsement nor one purporting to prohibit further transfer
of the instrument prevents its further transfer or negotia-
tion, and the transferee may enforce payment in disregard of
the limitation; but except for an intermediary bank and a
payor bank which is not a depositary bank the indorsee and
any subsequent transferee takes the instrument or its pro-
ceeds subject to any rights of the indorser."52
The most significant change brought about by section 3-205
of the 1952 draft of the Code was its proposed nullification of
the rule of NIL section 36(1), 53 classifying an endorsement
which prohibits the further negotiation of an instrument as re-
50. Britton, Tran8fers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law and Article 3 of the Uniform Commeroal Code, 32 TEx. L. REv. 153, 165
(1953).
51. Dickson Ice Cream Co. v. Knight, 177 La. 735, 149 So. 439 (1933).
52. As amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT
AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1955). Before amendment
section 3-205 provided: "Neither a conditional indorsement nor one purporting
to prohibit further transfer of the instrument prevents its further transfer or
negotiation, and the transferee may enforce payment in disregard of the limita-
tion; but the indorsee and any other subsequent transferee except a collecting or
payor bank takes the instrument or its proceeds subject to any rights of the in-
dorser."
53, LA. R.S. 7:36(1) (1950).
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strictive. Instead, the 1952 draft made such endorsement con-
ditional rather than restrictive. However, this is changed by the
inclusion of subsection (2) in section 3-206 of the 1955 amend-
ments to the Code. This subsection adds a definition of re-
strictive endorsement even broader than NIL section 36, because
the definition in the former also includes conditional endorse-
ments.54 An instrument containing such a restrictive endorse-
ment as defined in section 3-206(2) would still be capable of
being transferred or negotiated and a subsequent endorsee
would be a holder. Comment 1 on section 3-205 makes clear,
however, that it is not within the power of an endorser to change
the character of the original obligation. It should be noted also
that section 3-205 applies to transfers as well as negotiations
while NIL section 36(1) is limited to negotiations.
Under NIL section 39,5" a payer of an instrument condition-
ally endorsed has the privilege of disregarding that condition
and making payment to the transferee. The Code further pro-
vides that the transferee under a conditional endorsement, or one
prohibiting transfer, has the right to enforce payment from a
prior party in disregard of the condition. However, as under
NIL section 39, the endorsee is subject to the rights of the en-
dorser who conditionally endorsed, and cannot take as a holder
in due course.
Furthermore, section 3-205 eliminates an uncertainty exist-
ing under NIL section 3956 by excepting from the above rule
intermediary banks and payer banks which are not depositary
banks, thus providing that such former banks are not subject to
the rights of the person endorsing restrictively. Depositary
banks continue to be subject to liability as is any transferee or
payer for mishandling instruments with a "restrictive endorse-
ment."
54. See the draftsmen's reason.for the change in section 3-206, SUPPLEMENT
No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAiT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFOaM
COMMERCIAL CODE, at 18 (1955).
1 55. LA. R.. 7:39 (1950) :"Wherean indorsement is conditional, a party re-
quired to pay the instrument may disregard the condition, and make payment to
the indorsee or his transferee, whether the condition has been fulfilled or not.
But any person to whom an instrument so indorsed is negotiated, will hold the
same, or the proceeds thereof, 'subject to the rights of the person indorsing condi-
tionally."
56. Cosway, Innovations in Articles Three and Four of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. Paon. 284, 300 (1951).
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Endorsement "For Collection," "For Deposit," To Agent or In
Trust; "Restrictive Endorsements."
UCC section 3-206 provides: "(1) When an indorse-
ment, whether blank or special, states that it is 'for collec-
tion,' 'for deposit,' or otherwise for the benefit or account
or use of the indorser or of another person
"(a) any subsequent party except either an intermediary
bank or payor bank which is not a depositary bank must
apply any value given by him for or on the security of the
instrument consistently with the indorsement;
"(b) to the extent that a purchaser does so he becomes a
holder for value.
"(2) In this Act, 'restrictive indorsement' means a con-
ditional indorsement, or one purporting to prohibit further
transfer of the instrument (3-205) or one which whether
blank or special states that it is 'for collection,' 'for deposit'
or otherwise for the benefit or account or use of the indorser
or of another person. ' 57
Section 3-206 of the 1952 draft of the Code eliminated the
use of the term "restrictive indorsement," which is used in NIL
sections 36 and 37. As has been noted in the discussion of sec-
tion 3-205, the type of endorsement that was "restrictive" under
NIL section 36 (1) because it prohibited further negotiation, was
treated as a type of conditional endorsement by the 1952 draft.
The 1955 amendment to section 3-206 of the Code restores the
use of the term "restrictive" endorsement as used in the NIL,
and broadens it by including conditional endorsements within its
definition.
The Code eliminates the provisions of NIL sections 4758 and
57. As amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT
AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1955). Before amendment
section 3-206 provided: "When an indorsement, whether blank or special, states
that it is 'for collection,' 'for deposit,' or otherwise for the benefit or account or
use of the indorser or of another person (a) the first taker under the indorse-
ment must apply any value given by him for or on the security of the instrument
in the manner and to the person or account directed by the indorsement; (b) to
the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for value; (c) later holders for
value are not affected by the direction contained in the indorsement unless they
have reasonable grounds to believe that a fiduciary has negotiated:the instrument
in breach of duty (Subsection (2) (b.) of Section 3-404)."
58. LA. R.S. 7:47 (1950) :- "An instrument negotiable in its origin continues
to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or discharged by payment
or otherwise."
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37.59 Those sections along with NIL section 36(3) have been
construed by the courts to reach the result that a bona fide pur-
chaser from a restrictive endorser covered by NIL section 36 (3),
who was not in the chain of title, could not be a holder in due
course with regard to equities and defenses to which the re-
strictive endorser was subject.60  Subsection (c) 61 of section
3-206 of the 1952 draft of the Code was intended to repudiate
that rule and allow holders for value who take from agent en-
dorsees62 or endorsees in trust0 3 to become holders in due course,
unless they had reason to believe that a fiduciary had negotiated
the instrument in breach of duty.64 However, by the omission
of the provisions of subsection (c) from the 1955 amendments to
the Code and by the change of language in subsection (a), the
result reached by the courts under the NIL, as pointed out above,
would also be reached by the amended Code. Thus, any party,
except an intermediary bank or payer bank which is not a de-
positary bank, who purchases an instrument which has been
restrictively endorsed as defined in section 3-206(2) could not
be a holder in due course and could only qualify as a holder for
value to the extent that he applies any value given by him for or
on the security of the instrument consistently with the endorse-
ment. The result reached by the 1952 draft was due to its treat-
ment of endorsements for the benefit, account, or use of the
endorser or someone else as being basically blank or special en-
dorsements, to be treated in light of subsections (a), (b), and
(c) of section 3-206.65 The amended section 3-206 regards such
endorsements as "restrictive." In the final analysis the 1955
amendments restore the "restrictive" endorsement, but do not
59. LA. R.S. 7:37 (1950) : "A restrictive indorsement confers upon the in-
dorsee the right, (1) To receive payment of the instrument; (2) To bring any
action thereon that the indorser could bring; (3) To transfer his right as such
indorsee, where the form of the indorsement authorizes him to do so. But all
subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of the first indorsee under the restrictive
indorsement."
60. Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N.W. 93 (1919).
61. Quoted in note 57 supra.
62. LA. R.S. 7:36(2) (1950) : "An indorsement is restrictive which . . . (2)
Constitutes the indorsee the agent of the Indorser. .. "
63. LA. R.S. 7:36(3) (1950) : "An indorsement is restrictive, which . .. : (3)
Vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some other person."
64. UCC 3-304(2) (b) : "The purchaser has notice of a claim against the in-
strument when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a fiduciary has negotiated
the instrument in payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction
for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty."
65. Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments




allow such an endorsement to preclude further negotiation, as is
permitted in NIL section 47.
By including the term "for deposit" within its definition of
"restrictive" endorsements, the Code settles a serious conflict
which exists under the NIL.6 6 But the Code is silent as to the
status of the much-used endorsement, "Pay any bank or banker"
and therefore fails to settle the controversy as to whether or not
such endorsement is restrictive.6 7
Conclusion
Generally speaking, the pertinent sections of the Code deal-
ing with transfer and negotiation represent improvements over
their counterparts in the NIL. Furthermore, the 1955 amend-
ments to the Code have eliminated two of the greatest objections
to the 1952 draft. The amended Code includes a definition of
"restrictive" endorsement, and it permits a holder to convert a
blank endorsement into a special one. Both provisions were
omitted from the 1952 verson of the Code. There still exists in
the Code, however, a conflict between the definition of "bearer"
in section 1-201 (5) and section 3-204(2). This conflict is non-
existent under the NIL and should be corrected. Until this and
other difficulties are eliminated it is submitted that serious con-
sideration to the adoption of the Code in Louisiana be deferred.
However, in order to preserve the desired uniformity of the Code,
such changes should be made by the Code's draftsmen and not by
Louisiana individually.
Billy H. Hines
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana- Material Alterations
One of the several defenses available to parties to negotiable
instruments under the NIL and the earlier law merchant is to
show that the instrument has been materially altered. Now that
the Uniform Commercial Code has been drafted, it is the pur-
pose of this Comment to analyze the contents of the Code provi-
66. BRITTON, BiLLs AND NoTEs 268 (1943).
67. In First Nat. Bank v. Cross & Napper, 157 So. 636 (La. App. 1934), the
court held that such endorsement was not restrictive and did transfer title. See
Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEx. L. REv. 153, 170 (1953).
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